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Sanctioned Unemployment:  
The Impact of Occupational Licensing Restrictions on Ex-
Offenders 
Annie Zhang* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1898, the Supreme Court recognized that occupational licensing 
restrictions created tension between criminal justice and public health, 
safety, and welfare.1 Since then, federal and state governments have 
continued to enforce contradictory policies; expending an enormous 
amount of resources to penalize and rehabilitate offenders while at the 
same time, undermining the effectiveness of criminal justice efforts by 
disqualifying ex-offenders from as many as 6,0002 occupations. Marc La 
Cloche’s grueling fight for his opportunity to work as a barber highlights 
the debilitating impact that nonsensical and convoluted occupational 
licensing regulatory schemes can have on ex-offender reentry efforts.  
When Mr. La Cloche was twenty-four years old, he was convicted of 
armed robbery.3 While incarcerated for eleven years, Mr. La Cloche was 
“an admirable prisoner.”4 He completed a drug rehabilitation program, 
earned his high school equivalency degree, and consistently received 
favorable evaluations.5 The New York State correctional facility also 
offered vocational training courses, purportedly to prepare inmates for 
post-incarceration opportunities.6 In fourteen months, Mr. La Cloche took 
fifty barbering classes, completed 1,200 hours of training,7 and obtained 
two certificates.8 In 2000, the New York State Parole Board granted Mr. 
 
      *      J.D. (2018), Washington University School of Law. 
1. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). Hereinafter, “occupational licensing restrictions” 
or “record-based occupational licensing laws” refer to licensure laws that, by statutory mandate or in 
practice, bar ex-offenders from qualifying for licenses to work in the regulated occupations.  
2. Stacy A. Hickox, A Call to Reform State Restrictions on Hiring Ex-offenders, 12 STAN. J.C.R. 
& C.L. 121, 151 (2016). 
3. Matter of La Cloche v. Daniels, No. 403466/2003, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2006). 
4. Id.  
5. Id. at 2-3.   
6. Id. at 3.  
7. Dareh Gregorian, Ex-Con Barber in Hair Tangle, N.Y. POST (Feb. 21, 2003), 
https://nypost.com/2003/02/21/ex-con-barber-in-hair-tangle/. 
8. Matter of La Cloche, slip op. at 3. 
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La Cloche’s request for early release based on his good conduct.9 Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. La Cloche applied to the New York Division of Licensing 
Services (“the Licensing Board”) for his barber apprentice license.10 The 
Licensing Board denied Mr. La Cloche’s application solely because his 
criminal history indicated a lack of requisite moral character and 
trustworthiness.11  
Mr. La Cloche doggedly appealed the Licensing Board’s decision 
through every possible avenue.12 In the administrative hearing, Judge Felix 
Neals reversed the Licensing Board’s decision and Mr. La Cloche went on 
to work at two barbershops without incident.13 Meanwhile, the Licensing 
Board appealed the decision to the Secretary of State, who reversed Judge 
Neals’ decision and the Licensing Board revoked Mr. La Cloche’s 
license.14 Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Mr. La Cloche 
appealed the Secretary of State’s decision to the Supreme Court of New 
York.15 The court vacated the decision and remanded the case back to the 
administrative court to determine if Mr. La Cloche had the requisite moral 
character on the basis of his conviction and mitigating factors, such as 
evidence of rehabilitation.16 Additionally, Judge Herman Cahn chastised 
 
9. Id. In granting parole, the New York State Parole Board “necessarily found that there was a 
reasonable probability that, once he was released, he would ‘live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law,’ and that his release ‘was not incompatible with the welfare of society’ and would 
not deprecate the seriousness of his crime.” Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id. at 3-4.  
12. After the Licensing Board denies a candidate’s application, the candidate may request an 
administrative hearing. The applicant has the burden of proof to show by substantial evidence that he 
or she meets the licensing qualifications. Thereafter, the presiding Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
will either approve or deny the application. What Is a Hearing?, DEP’T OF ST., OFF. OF ADMIN. 
HEARINGS, https://www.dos.ny.gov/ooah/what_is_a_hearing.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). If the 
ALJ approves the application, the Licensing Board may appeal the decision to the Secretary of State. If 
either the ALJ denies the application or the Secretary of State reverses the ALJ’s decision and the 
applicant has exhausted all administrative remedies, the applicant may appeal the decision to the 
Supreme Court of New York. See What Happens After The Hearing?, DEP’T OF ST., OFF. OF ADMIN. 
HEARINGS, https://www.dos.ny.gov/ooah/after_hearing.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2018); Marc La 
Cloche, 21 DOS APP 01 (N.Y. DEP’T OF ST. Dec. 4, 2001), 
https://docs.dos.ny.gov/ooah/decisions/appeals/21dosapp01. 
htm. 
13. Matter of La Cloche, slip op. at 4. Judge Neals also determined that “good moral character is 
not a requirement for a [barber apprentice] license.” Id.  
14. Id.  
15. La Cloche v. Daniels, 755 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
16. Id. at 830.  
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the State’s actions: 
 
If the State offers this vocational training program to persons who 
are incarcerated, it must offer them a reasonable opportunity to use 
the skills learned thereby, after they are released from prison. . . . To 
refuse to certify an applicant as a barber apprentice solely because 
of a previous criminal conviction would be to deny the applicant the 
opportunity to practice a trade which the State itself taught 
him/her.17 
 
For the new administrative hearing, Mr. La Cloche submitted 
overwhelming evidence from multiple employers in support of his good 
moral character and fitness for barbering.18 Despite all of this, Judge Roger 
Schneier made a subjective determination that Mr. La Cloche lacked 
remorse and ruled in favor of the government.19 With admirable 
determination, Mr. La Cloche appealed the unfavorable decision back to 
the Supreme Court of New York.20 Before the court could make a 
decision, Mr. La Cloche died, as a highly qualified barber, in demand by 
employers, trained by the State, and yet denied employment by the State in 
deference to the state court.21 The court had to dismiss the case after Mr. 
La Cloche’s death, but Judge Louis York felt “compelled to comment 
upon the injustice” of this case22 and criticized the State’s deplorable 
actions in his written opinion. Judge York accused the State of: (1) 
successfully rehabilitating an inmate and then vigorously fighting to deny 
[Mr. La. Cloche] the right to live a rehabilitated life;23 (2) improperly and 
irrationally denying Mr. La Cloche’s license application24; and (3) acting 
 
17. Id.  
18. Matter of La Cloche, slip op. at 5. Michael Santos of Diamond Cuts said that Mr. La Cloche 
“would be his first choice to manage a second store . . . .” Id. A minister and his wife of God’s 
Property, praised Mr. La Cloche’s work and high moral character. Id. Mr. La Cloche’s parole officer 
submitted a reference that Mr. La Cloche satisfied all conditions of his parole. Id. 
19. Id. at 5-6. Judge Schneier decided that Mr. La Cloche lacked sufficient remorse for the crime 
because of Mr. La Cloche’s imperfect memory of the armed robbery. Id. at 6.   
20. Id.  
21. See Clyde Haberman, Ex-Inmate’s Legacy: Victory Over Bias and Catch-22 Bureaucracy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/nyregion/29nyc.html.  
22. Matter of La Cloche, slip op. at 7.  
23. Id. at 8.  
24. Id. at 8-9. The court stated that Judge Schneider should not have considered Mr. La Cloche’s 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“contrary to its own statutorily mandated policies.”25    
Mr. La Cloche may have been unique in his tenacity but he was just 
one among many ex-offenders who continue to face insurmountable 
barriers to legitimate employment.  More than 600,000 people are released 
from state and federal prisons each year.26 Nearly 5 million adults are 
either under supervision, on probation, or on parole.27 Approximately 70 
million people have an arrest or conviction record.28 And despite the 
criminal justice system’s policy to punish, deter, and rehabilitate, the 
United States has a 67.5% recidivism rate within three years of release.29 
Ironically, researchers believe that the number one factor to counter 
recidivism is gainful employment.30  
 
remorse and responsibility for his previous offense because those issues were reserved for the New 
York State Parole Board. Id.; see also supra note 9. Additionally, the court noted that Judge Schneider 
should have given weight to Mr. La Cloche’s post-incarceration conduct and conduct in the profession. 
Matter of La Cloche, slip op. at 9. Finally, the court specified that Judge Schneider’s consideration of 
moral character exceeded the scope of the traditional evaluation for a barber’s license. Id. 
25. Id. at 9. “The public policy of this state . . . [is] to encourage the licensure and employment of 
persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses.” N.Y. CORR. LAW § 753(a)(1976) 
(amended in 2007 but the statutory language remains the same). 
26. E. ANNE CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 
2016 10 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf.  
27. DANIELLE KAEBLE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE,  PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015 (2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus15.pdf. 
28. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
UNLICENSED & UNTAPPED: REMOVING BARRIERS TO STATE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES FOR PEOPLE 
WITH RECORDS 6 (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Unlicensed-Untapped-Removing-
Barriers-State-Occupa 
tional-Licenses.pdf. 
29. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (Bulletin No. NCJ 
193427, June 2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. In the seminal study, Langan and 
Levin tracked nearly 300,000 prisoners, released in fifteen states, and for the course of three years. Id. 
See also ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rp 
r83.pdf (a study of 16,000 prisoners released during 1983 found that the recidivism rate was about 
forty-seven percent).      
30. Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for 
Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 WAYNE STATE J.L. 
SOC’Y 18, 22 (2005). See also SHARRON D. MATTHEWS & AMANDA CASARJIAN, SAFER FOUND., 
GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL POLICIES IMPACTING THE HIRING OF EX-OFFENDERS (2002), 
http://www.saferfoundation.org/files/documents/CARRE%20Paper%203.pdf (discussing empirical 
research on the impact of unemployment and recidivism). 
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The prevalence of occupational licensing restrictions is a formidable 
barrier to reentry efforts, particularly when they relate to low-income 
occupations such as barbering and cosmetology. By reforming those laws 
and corresponding regulatory schemes, ex-offenders will have a realistic 
opportunity to reclaim their stake in society and contribute to the 
economic welfare of the community. Part I of this Note examines the 
history of occupational licensing laws and legal challenges based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part II identifies problems with the current 
occupational licensing framework and the impact of Supreme Court 
precedent on the validity of occupational licensing laws. Part III proposes 
that states require: (1) licensing boards to consider rehabilitation factors in 
assessing an ex-offender’s application; (2) a direct relationship between 
the conviction and the licensed occupation; and (3) a presumption for 
licensure for ex-offenders who complete the correctional facility 
vocational training program. By prioritizing occupational licensing reform, 
states can provide ex-offenders legitimate rehabilitation opportunities and 
reconcile criminal justice and public safety policies.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Spread of Occupational Licensing Laws 
 
1. In General 
 
Occupational licensing laws are meant to ensure that the quality of 
goods and services in certain industries meet baseline standards.31 Federal, 
state, and local governments grant licenses to permit recipients to engage 
in activities that ordinary members of the public are not legally able to 
perform.32 The state draws on its “police power” to regulate occupations 
 
31. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 6 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonemb 
argo.pdf [hereinafter THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT]. 
32. Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component of Occupational Licensing 
Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D.L. REV. 187, 189 
(1995).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that implicate public health, safety, and welfare.33 Noncompliance with 
occupational licensing laws entails financial and legal consequences. 
Three common penalties include: (1) fines or other financial measures; (2) 
administrative or criminal offenses that range from misdemeanors to 
felonies; or (3) an unenforceable contract between the ex-offender (service 
or good provider) and the other party.34 
The share of the workforce requiring occupational licensing has grown 
exponentially over time. In the early 1950s, less than five percent of the 
workforce was subject to state occupational licensing laws.35 As of 2008, 
twenty-five percent were subject to state laws and an additional four 
percent were subject to local and federal laws.36 About two-thirds of the 
increase in licensed workers is due to a growing number of regulations 
targeting various occupations and the remaining one-third is from the 
growing number of workers in the service sector.37  
Occupational licensing laws are classified as either revenue-raising or 
regulatory.38 A revenue-raising licensing law requires that an applicant 
pays a routine fee in order to engage in the business or profession.39 A 
regulatory licensing law either prescribes qualifications for an occupation 
or grants a government agency broad authority to do so, commonly 
through a licensing board.40 These qualifications often include a 
competency component and a character component.41 Competency refers 
 
33. ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES 111 (N.Y.U. 
Press 2008); but cf. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209 (2016) (arguing that occupational licensing laws should not be a legitimate 
exercise of state power).  
34. May, supra note 32, at 191-92. See, e.g., City of Beaufort v. Holcombe, 369 S.C. 643, 647 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming the defendant’s conviction and sentence to thirty days in jail or 
payment of a fine and administrative penalties for operating a business without a license). 
35. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 17. 
36. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 17. 
37. See THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 19-22. Eleven of the twelve occupations 
with the most licensed workers provide services: health care practitioners, education, transportation, 
sales, management, construction, personal care, protective service, health care support, installation and 
maintenance, business and financial. Id. at 21.  
38. May, supra note 32, at 189. The state legislature creates the licensing board and the governor 
appoints members from the profession to serve on those boards. Id. 
39. May, supra note 32, at 189-90. This tends to be a ministerial procedure and the state does not 
consider an applicant’s background or competence.  May, supra note 32, at 190. 
40. May, supra note 32, at 190; Larkin, supra note 33, at 213. 
41. THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 111.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/18
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to training or experience.42 Character generally refers to at least one of the 
following requirements: (1) no criminal conviction; (2) good moral 
character (or a lack of evidence of moral turpitude); (3) reputable 
character; or (4) honest and trustworthy character.43 Despite the 
significance of the character component, statutory definitions for “good 
moral character” or “moral turpitude” are ambiguous and highly 
discretionary.44 As a result, ex-offenders are frequently disqualified on the 
basis of their criminal background.45  
 
2. Variance Among the States 
 
States differ in regard to the types of regulated occupations, specific 
competency and character requirements, and how licensing boards 
interpret equivocal requirements such as “moral character.” The number of 
occupations that require a license in at least one state may be as few as 
1,10046 or as many as nearly 6,000.47  Yet, less than sixty occupations are 
regulated in all fifty states.48 841 different statutory licensing provisions 
enable licensing boards to deny ex-offenders licenses solely on the basis of 
their past criminal conduct.49 1,814 licensing provisions require good 
 
42. For example, Oklahoma requires a hairbraiding technician to complete 600 hours in 
“bacteriology, chemistry, anatomy, physiology, sterilization and sanitation[,] hairbraiding/hairweaving 
skills (includes purpose and effect, procedures, repair, removal of weft, sizing and finishing, extension 
and maintenance/care of braids/weaves[,] salon development[,] and board rules, regulations and 
statutes.” OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §175:10-3-43 (2017). 
43. May, supra note 32, at 195, 199.  
44. May, supra note 32, at 197-98, n. 66. “Moral turpitude is generally understood as behavior 
that violates accepted moral standards of the community.” May, supra note 32, at 199. For example, 
South Dakota requires that “any licensee . . . must be a person of good moral character, never 
convicted of a felony, and, if a corporation, the managing officers thereof must have like 
qualifications.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-2-6.2 (2018). Mississippi defines “good moral character” as 
“a pattern of behavior conforming to the profession’s ethical standards and behavior that indicates 
honesty and truthfulness, integrity, respect among the community for lawful behavior, respect for the 
rights of others, and obedience to the lawful directives of public officers or officials or persons charged 
with the enforcement of the law and showing an absence of moral turpitude.” MISS. ADMIN. CODE § 
30-27-3103:1.1(1) (2015).  
45. See THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 111-12; May, supra note 32, at 197.  
46. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 7.  
47. Hickox, supra note 2, at 151. 
48. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 7. 
49. HUNT ET. AL., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWS, LICENSE AND THE OFFENDER’S RIGHT 
TO WORK 5 (1973). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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moral character.50 410 statutory provisions disqualify an applicant based 
on a criminal offense of moral turpitude.51  
States also vary in the amount of discretion licensing boards have to 
determine the impact of past criminal convictions (and arrests) on 
licensing eligibility. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have 
no standards for how a licensing board should consider an applicant’s 
criminal record, which may result in the automatic disqualification of ex-
offenders.52 The remaining twenty-five states do require some relationship 
between the ex-offender’s criminal offense and the professional 
responsibilities in the particular occupation.53 A comprehensive survey 
showed that thirty-eight states allow licensing boards to also consider 
arrests that did not result in convictions.54 Nine states restrict inquiry into 
such arrests.55 Two states forbid public employers and licensing boards 
 
50. Id. For example, New York provides that the purpose of its barbering licensing requirements 
is for:  
The need for technical skill, training and experience, good health, good moral character 
and other fundamental qualities and qualifications in persons engaged in the practice of 
barbering, as herein defined, having been unquestionably established and demonstrated and in 
order to safeguard the health of the persons who patronize the barber shops of our state and 
because of the evils connected with itinerant barbers and barber shops and because of the 
inadequacy of local regulation[.]  
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 430 (McKinney 2015). 
51. HUNT ET. AL., supra note 50.  
52. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 36.  
53. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 36. For example, Texas requires that, “Each 
licensing authority shall issue guidelines relating to the practice of the licensing authority under this 
chapter. The guidelines must state the reasons a particular crime is considered to relate to a particular 
license and any other criterion that affects the decisions of the licensing authority.” TEX. OCC. CODE 
ANN. § 53.025 (West 2012). 
54. Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels, Twelfth Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban 
Challenges: Statutory Limitations on Civil Rights of People with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1501, 1503-04 (2003). 
55. Id. at 1504. These nine states include: California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id. For example, Ohio specifies that in any 
application for license:  
 
[A] person may not be questioned with respect to any record that has been sealed . . . .” If such 
inquiry is made, “the person whose official record was sealed may respond as if the arrest 
underlying the case to which the sealed official records pertain and all other proceedings in that 
case did not occur, and the person . . . shall not be subject to any adverse action because of the 
arrest, the proceedings, or the person’s response. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.55 (LexisNexis 2010).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/18
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from considering arrests at all.56 And one state forbids public employers 
from considering arrests.57  
 
B. Legal Challenges to the Validity of Occupational Licensing Laws 
 
1. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
 
Occupational licensing restrictions may be unconstitutional per the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Equal 
Protection Clause mandates that states cannot “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”58 The Due Process Clause 
provides that states cannot “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”59 Courts apply different standards of review 
according to: (1) the classification of the private party in the suit or (2) the 
type of regulated activity.60  
Under the Equal Protection Clause, ex-offenders may allege that the 
state’s occupational licensing restriction discriminates against people with 
criminal records. The now infamous footnote in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co. established a hierarchy system of judicial review.61 Justice 
Stone suggested that a “more exacting judicial scrutiny” may be 
appropriate in cases where the law “prejudices against discrete and insular 
minorities.”62 Since then, courts have recognized race and alienage, among 
others, as suspect classifications that are reviewed under strict scrutiny.63 
Gender, among others, is a quasi-suspect classification that is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.64 Alternatively, courts will also apply strict scrutiny 
to laws that affect fundamental rights.65 However, an ex-offender’s 
 
56. These two states are Arkansas and New Mexico. Mukamal, supra note 54, at 1504. 
57. This state is New Hampshire. Id.  
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
59. Id.  
60. Infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
61. 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938). 
62. Id. 
63. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(1971) (alienage).  
64. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
65. May, supra 32, at 204.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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criminal record is not a suspect classification66 and the ability to work in 
certain occupations is not a fundamental right.67 Therefore, courts will 
apply minimum scrutiny (rational basis review) such that the occupational 
licensing law only needs to relate generally to a legitimate or “any 
reasonably conceivable” state purpose.68             
Ex-offenders may also allege that the state violated the Due Process 
Clause by depriving them of a liberty interest to pursue an occupation by 
way of inadequate procedures or substance.69 In very simplified terms and 
as applied to the occupational licensing context, procedural due process 
requires that the review process of a person’s application is fair.70 This is a 
fact-specific balancing inquiry that weighs the rights at risk with the 
interests involved.71 Substantive due process requires that the licensing 
requirements have a rational relationship to either an applicant’s ability to 
provide services in the regulated occupation or to the state’s purpose in 
 
66. See, e.g., Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of the 
defendant’s equal protection claim because his wife, an ex-offender, was not part of a suspect class 
and that there was a rational relationship between suspension of conjugal visits and purpose of prison 
regulations); cf. Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying rational basis review 
because “prisoners [were] not a suspect class and there [was] no fundamental constitutional right to 
parole.”). 
67. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Exam’rs., 651 F. Supp. 664, 671 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (declining to 
apply heightened scrutiny because pursuing an occupation as a school principal was not a 
“fundamental right” and status as an applicant for a principal position did not entail a suspect 
classification).   
68. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns. Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case 
for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1215-16 (2006).Where courts 
have overturned licensing restrictions, they have found a lack of adequate rational relationship 
between the restriction and the government interest. The conviction “is often, but not always, minor, 
nonexistent, or old.” Id. at 1216. See also, Doe v. Saenz, 140 Cal. App. 4th 960, 993 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that the state licensing law violated the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis 
review because statutory classifications of certain convictions as non-exempt or exempt did not relate 
to a valid state purpose).   
69. Thomas v. Bd. of Exam’rs., 651 F. Supp. at 665. See also, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 
U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (holding that a federal regulation that barred noncitizens from employment in 
federal service deprived resident aliens of their Fifth Amendment right to due process). Although an 
ex-offender may also allege that the state deprived him or her of a property interest without due 
process, this argument will likely fail because he has no claim of entitlement to an occupation unless 
there is, for example, a legitimate contract. Thomas v. Bd. of Exam’rs., 651 F. Supp. at 667; see also 
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 452 (1954) (plaintiff alleged that that New York’s standard for 
his license suspension hearing deprived him of his property rights to his license and medical practice).      
70. Thomas v. Bd. of Exam’rs., 651 F. Supp. at 668. 
71. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/18
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exercising its police power to protect public health, safety, or welfare.72     
 
2. Guidance from the Supreme Court 
 
Supreme Court precedent establishes some limits to the scope of 
occupational licensing restrictions to ensure that they are constitutional 
under the Due Process Clause but generally, the holdings are still 
deferential to the states. In Hawker v. New York, the Supreme Court 
upheld a New York Public Health Law that made it a crime for any person 
convicted of a felony to practice medicine.73 Although the Supreme Court 
recognized that there have been no definitive limits placed on the bounds 
of a state’s police power, it was undeniable that “legislation which simply 
defines the qualifications of one who attempts to practice medicine is a 
proper exercise of that power.”74  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that just as the state can 
impose a competency requirement, the state may “with equal propriety” 
prescribe a character requirement and the evidence it entailed based on 
“whatever is ordinarily connected with bad character, or indicative of it.”75  
And a criminal conviction may be “conclusive evidence” of questionable 
character.76 After its strongly deferential commentary about state power, 
the Supreme Court attempted to offer some reprieve for barred ex-
offenders: “Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may 
thereafter reform and become in fact possessed of a good moral character. 
But the legislature has power in cases of this kind to make a rule of 
universal application.”77 
In affirming Hawker’s conviction for the illegal practice of medicine, 
the Supreme Court established that occupational licensing laws are 
definitively up to the state’s legislative functions, there is a rational basis 
between an ex-offender’s criminal record and licensing qualifications, and 
a state may determine what constitutes bad moral character. Where the 
 
72. Id. at 669; Indep. Electricians and Elec. Contractors’ Ass’n. v. N.J. Bd. of Exam’rs. of Elec. 
Contractors, 226 A.2d 169, 175-76 (N.J. 1967); THOMPSON, supra note 33. 
73. 170 U.S. 189, 190 (1898). 
74. Id. at 194. 
75. Id. at 194-95. 
76. Id. at 196. 
77. Id. at 197. 
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state passes an occupational licensing law for the protection of public 
health, safety, and welfare, it is within the state’s police power and does 
not impinge on the Fourteenth Amendment.78  
Notably after the Supreme Court legitimized state power to legislate 
record-based occupational licensing laws, the Supreme Court in Barsky v. 
Board of Regents suggested that an absolute ban of ex-offenders from 
license occupations violated the Due Process Clause.79 The New York 
licensing board suspended Barsky’s medical license after he was convicted 
for contempt.80 Barsky alleged that the state law and the actions of the 
Medical Committee on Grievances and the subcommittees violated his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.81 Regarding the state law, the 
Supreme Court held that the state legitimately exercised its police power 
because it “sought to attain its justifiable end by making the conviction of 
any crime a violation of its professional medical standards, and then 
leaving it to a qualified board of doctors to determine initially the measure 
of discipline to be applied to the offending practitioner.”82 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court rejected Barsky’s claim against the committees 
because there was insufficient evidence.83 Despite this holding, the Court 
proposed in dicta that professional licenses could not be automatically 
suspended or revoked post-conviction:84  
 
The issue is not before us but it has not been questioned that the 
State could make it a condition of admission to practice that 
applicants shall not have been convicted of a crime in a court of 
competent jurisdiction either within or without the State of New 
 
78. Id. at 200. Although Hawker v. New York is not a Fourteenth Amendment case, the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in favor of its decision that regulatory collateral consequences did not violate the 
Article I, section 10 ex post facto clause has important ramifications for Equal Protection Clause cases. 
See Aukerman, supra note 30, at 28.   
79. 347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
80. Id. at 443. The New York State Education Law stated that if a practitioner was convicted of a 
crime, he or she may be suspended after a due hearing. Id. at 445-46.  
81. Id. at 454. Barsky contended that in the administrative hearing: (1) the committee based its 
decision on immaterial and prejudicial evidence; (2) the committee exceeded its statutory authority 
because there was insufficient legal evidence; and (3) the committee’s actions were capricious and 
arbitrary. Id. 
82. Id. at 451. 
83. Id. at 455. 
84. Id. at 451.         
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York. It could at least require a disclosure of such convictions as a 
condition of admission and leave it to a competent board to 
determine, after opportunity for a fair hearing, whether the 
convictions, if any, were of such a date and nature as to justify 
denial of admission to practice in the light of all material 
circumstances before the board.85  
 
A few years later in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New 
Mexico, the Supreme Court considered the question left open in Barsky: 
How can criminal records be used in the decision-making process for an 
ex-offender’s licensing application pursuant to the Due Process Clause?86 
A unanimous Supreme Court held that while a state may establish 
occupational licensing qualifications, such as “good moral character,” 
“any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s 
fitness or capacity to practice [in that occupation].”87 For Schware, his use 
of aliases, prior arrests, and association with the Communist Party more 
than fifteen years ago were not indicative of his lack of good moral 
character.88 Contrary to the licensing board’s findings, the Supreme Court 
noted the amount of evidence in support of his moral character: (1) the 
length of time between his arrest and his current bar application and (2) his 
good reputation among his law school teachers and peers, associates, and 
synagogue.89 Since there was no rational basis for the licensing board’s 
finding that Schware did not have the requisite moral character to practice 
law, the Supreme Court held that the state violated Schware’s right to due 
process.90    
 
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on the protected 
classes of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.91 Discrimination 
 
85. Barsky, 347 U.S. at 451.  
86. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
87. Id. at 239.  
88. Id. at 242-43.  
89. Id. at 240-41. 
90. Id. at 247. 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). 
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may be premised on disparate treatment or disparate impact.92 Since 
record-based employer hiring policies are analogous to record-based 
occupational licensing laws, ex-offenders may allege that the laws 
themselves or as applied by the licensing boards violate Title VII. 
Disparate treatment exists when an employer (or licensing board) treats 
an applicant differently because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.93 The burden- of-proof shifts between the applicant and the 
employer (or state): (1) the applicant must establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination; (2) the employer must provide a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision; then (3) the applicant must show 
that the employer’s reason was pretext for discrimination.94 As applied to 
the occupational licensing context, an ex-offender must make a prima 
facie showing that the licensing board treated the criminal record of a 
protected class differently than that of an applicant in a non-protected 
class.95 However, these types of cases provide “extreme deference to 
employers.”96 
Disparate impact exists when a seemingly neutral policy or practice 
results in the disproportionate exclusion of a protected class.97 Again, the 
burden-of-proof shifts between the applicant and the employer (or state): 
(1) the applicant must identify the facially neutral policy or practice and 
establish that it has an unlawful adverse impact on a protected class; (2) 
the employer must demonstrate that the challenged policy or practice is 
related to the position and satisfies a business necessity; then (3) the 
 
92. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: CONSIDERATION 
OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 6 (2012)[hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE] (noting that the 
combination of particularly high arrest and incarceration rates for African American and Hispanic 
populations and the increased access to criminal history information necessitates agency guidance to 
help eliminate unlawful employment discrimination).  
93. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 92, at 6.  
94. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). 
95. A classic example is when an employer rejects an African American applicant with a criminal 
history and hires a Caucasian applicant with a similar criminal history. EEOC ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE, supra note 92, at 6. Evidence of disparate treatment may include biased statements, 
inconsistencies in the hiring process, success of similarly situated applicants, employment testing, and 
statistical evidence. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 92, at 8. 
96. Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination Against 
Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 74 (2015). 
97. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 92, at 8.  
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applicant must propose that there is a less discriminatory alternative to 
achieve the employer’s purpose and the employer refused to adopt it.98 
Since ex-offenders are not part of a statutorily protected class on the basis 
of having a criminal record, they must allege that the record-based 
occupational licensing law is discriminatory against applicants of a 
particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.99 
The seminal disparate impact case Green v. Missouri P.R. Co. involved 
an employer-created policy, which is analogous to occupational licensing 
restrictions. 100 The Missouri Pacific Railroad Company had a blanket ban 
on the employment of any person convicted of a crime.101 Green alleged 
that the policy violated Title VII because, as applied, the policy 
discriminated against African Americans and was not job-related.102 Green 
successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination through 
statistical analysis, which showed that African American applicants were 
disqualified from employment at a substantially higher rate than white 
applicants.103 The Eighth Circuit then considered whether there was a 
business necessity such as a relationship to job performance.104 While the 
circuit court gave some credence to the company’s justifications, the 
policy violated Title VII because there was no conceivable reason for the 
automatic ban.105 In the post-remand appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
trial court’s decision to allow the railroad company to use criminal 
conviction as a factor in the employment decision if the company also 
considered: (1) “the nature and gravity of the offense or offenses”; (2) the 
time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of sentence”; 
and (3) “the nature of the job for which the applicant has applied”.106 
 
 
 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1).  
99. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 92, at 6, 8.  
100. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).   
101. Id. at 1292. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1295. 
104. Id. at 1296 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).  
105. Id. at 1298. The company proffered that they feared theft, the job may require handing of 
company funds, potential liability for hiring ex-offenders, the effects of recidivism on workforce 
stability, and lack of moral character. Id.  
106. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1159-1160 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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II. ANALYSIS 
 
A criminal record tends to create a particularly debilitating effect on 
the trajectory of a person’s life. Researchers agree that after a certain 
number of years without incident, ex-offenders are no more likely to 
offend than their counterparts without past criminal convictions.107 Yet, 
occupational licensing restrictions continue to deter and even prevent 
rehabilitation efforts because ex-offenders cannot pursue a wide variety of 
high-skilled, semi-skilled, and low-skilled professions. State legislators 
must consider action and reform to address ambiguous statutory 
requirements, licensing boards’ disregard for rehabilitative factors, and 
disruptive state efforts that suppress the legitimacy of correctional 
vocational training.  
The spread of occupational licensing to upwards of 6,000 occupations 
and to twenty-nine percent of the workforce has profound economic 
ramifications.108 The total cost of licensing regulations is between $34.8 
billion to $41.7 billion per year.109 In barbering, hairdressing, and 
cosmetology, there will be a growth of approximately 64,000 positions 
between 2014 and 2024.110 However, in at least twenty-five states, a 
felony conviction is sufficient for disqualification.111 The economic cost to 
sustain occupational licensing requires a carefully constructed statutory 
regime that both protects the public and facilitates the criminal justice 
system’s rehabilitation goals.  
State-by-state differences in the types of regulated occupations and 
statutory competency and character requirements interfere with the 
efficiency and effectiveness of occupational licensing. When states ban ex-
offenders from certain occupations purportedly to protect public safety, 
health, and welfare, the message is that any and all past offenses (and 
 
107. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court also recognized that after a 
certain length of time without incident, criminal conduct has less weight among the totality of 
evidence. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
108. Hickox, supra note 2, at 151; THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31 at 17.  
109. ADAM B. SUMMERS, REASON FOUNDATION, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: RANKING THE 
STATES AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES 4 (2007), 
http://reason.org/files/762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b 
.pdf. 
110. RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 28, at 7. 
111. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 36. 
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potentially arrests) are so dangerous that they overcome all other evidence 
to the contrary and prevent the employment of an otherwise qualified 
applicant. 
Additionally, record-based qualifications such as “moral character” and 
“moral turpitude” tend to be overly inclusive. 112 These ambiguous terms 
exclude ex-offenders whose conduct provides no reasonable basis to 
conclude that they will be dangerous and untrustworthy employees.113 The 
Supreme Court recognized the ambiguity of “good moral character” 
stating: 
 
It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any 
definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and 
prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification, which is easily 
adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a dangerous 
instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial . . . .114 
 
Still, legislatures either do not define the meaning of “moral turpitude” 
and “moral character” or are satisfied with ambiguous statutory drafting, 
which affords licensing boards broad discretionary authority.115 As a 
result, licensing boards apply inconsistent interpretations of the statutes 
and may even abuse their discretion.116 Given the lack of clarity, a 
generally accepted definition of “moral character” defaults to “if a person 
has committed a crime, that person lacks the requisite good character for a 
license.”117 Legislatures and licensing boards should not categorically 
exclude ex-offenders just because crime is an easy characteristic to 
pinpoint.  
Furthermore, there is no rational relationship between the stringency of 
licensing requirements and the marginal benefit to public health, safety, 
and welfare. For example, cosmetologists are required to maintain 
licensing in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.118 States demand 
 
112. See supra note 45-47 and accompanying text.  
113. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
114. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957). 
115. MISS. ADMIN. CODE § 30-27-3103:1.1(1); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 430 (McKinney 2015). 
116. There is a plethora of research premised on the antitrust behavior of licensing occupations.  
117. May, supra note 32, at 197. 
118. Larkin, supra note 33, at 221.  
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between 233 days to 490 days of education and training, with the  average 
being 372 days.119 Emergency medical technicians are also licensed in all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia.120 Periods of education and 
training vary from zero to 140 days, with an average of thirty-three 
days.121 It seems incongruous that people who regularly face life or death 
situations are required to have an average of ninety percent fewer days of 
training than people who provide consumer services. 
There are attempts to alleviate the burden on ex-offenders. Some states 
issue rehabilitation certificates as evidence of sufficient “moral 
character.”122  These certificates have “little operational usefulness” 
because they are not conclusive proof of sufficient character.123 Other 
states provide a list of rehabilitation factors for the licensing board to 
consider.124 In theory, this is sensible because research shows that there is 
an inversely proportional relationship between the length of time since 
offense and the likelihood to reoffend.125 However, a licensing board has 
free rein to interpret and apply these factors.   
Even though occupational licensing often unduly restricts an ex-
offender’s ability to work, complainants who attempt to seek recourse 
through the Fourteenth Amendment are subject to rational basis review 
and they have generally been unsuccessful.126 The Hawker Court created a 
high burden when it granted broad authority for states to use their police 
power to set qualifications and determine what the requisite evidence 
 
119. Larkin, supra note 33, at 221. 
120. Larkin, supra note 33, at 221.  
121. Larkin, supra note 33, at 221.  
122. Summary of State Laws, LEGAL ACTION CENTER, https://lac.org/toolkits/certificates/ 
summary_s 
tate_laws.htm (last visited April 24, 2017). 
123. Hickox, supra note 2, at 142.  
124. See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
125. Studies show that after a certain number of years, an ex-offender is no more likely to 
commit another crime than any other person. In one study, researchers found that after ten years, an 
ex-offender is no more likely to commit an offense than a person without a record. Aukerman, supra 
note 30, at 25. Another study showed that young offenders “arrested at age 18 reaches age 24 without 
committing any more crimes, he or she is no more likely than someone with no prior record to commit 
a crime.”  Aukerman, supra note 30, at 25. And yet another frequently cited study found that after six 
or seven years without incidence, offenders are no more likely to offend than others. Megan 
Kurleycheck, Robert Brame & Shawn Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old 
Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483 (2006). 
126. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
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entails.127 And even more specifically, the Supreme Court provided that a 
criminal record “has some relation to character” thereby conveying that 
the licensing restrictions satisfies rational basis review.128 While protecting 
the public is a legitimate concern in industries that directly serve 
consumers, states cannot sacrifice one public good for another public 
good.  
The leading cases for Fourteenth Amendment claims have created a 
convoluted and disjointed course of evaluation. Subsequent to the 
preeminent Hawker decision, the Supreme Court in Barsky made it 
unconstitutional for a state to automatically suspend or revoke a person’s 
license post-conviction.129 However, Barsky left open the issue of whether 
it would be unconstitutional for a licensing board to bar an ex-offender in 
the initial licensing decision.130 In Schware, the Supreme Court only 
mandated that there must be a “rational connection” between the 
occupational licensing restriction and public health, safety, and welfare.131 
This is analogous to rational basis review under the Equal Protection and 
Due Process clauses, which is deferential to the states.132 The Supreme 
Court’s analysis was very specifically related to Schware’s situation and 
did not set standards that are more broadly applicable to licensing 
restrictions. Despite the lack of guidance, the Supreme Court in all three 
decisions expressed concern about the amount of weight that past criminal 
conduct should have on the licensing board’s decision-making process.133 
Although Title VII appears to be a promising avenue to combat 
discriminatory employer policies, it is an inadequate approach to oppose 
legally mandated occupational restrictions. The first problem is that ex-
offenders are not a protected class so they cannot rely on the trait that most 
 
127. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).  
128. Id. at 196. 
129. Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954). 
130. Barsky, 347 U.S. at 442; See Aukerman, supra note 30, at 31.  
131. Schware, supra note 86, at 239. 
132. Supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
133. “Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may thereafter reform and become in 
fact possessed of a good moral character.” Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898); the 
licensing board can determine “whether the convictions, if any, were of such a date and nature as to 
justify denial of admission to practice in the light of all material circumstances before the board.” 
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954); “The mere fact that a man has been arrested has 
very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.” Schware v. Bd. 
of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957). 
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directly prohibits their licensure.134 This excludes a large population of ex-
offenders, most obviously Caucasian males, who do not otherwise fit the 
characteristics of a protected class under Title VII. It is unlikely that 
Congress would amend Title VII to include ex-offenders as a protected 
class because the purpose of Title VII is to “protect vulnerable populations 
whose opportunities in the labor market historically have been limited by 
discrimination.”135 Historically, possessing a criminal history has not 
qualified an individual as part of a vulnerable population group or 
protected class. This will prevent many potential complainants from 
establishing that the occupational licensing law has an unlawful adverse 
impact on them.136 
The second problem is that even when a claimant successfully shifts 
the burden to the state or the state licensing board, the state is able to avail 
itself of permissive defenses such as demonstrating a business necessity or 
showing that the practice is sufficiently related to the occupation.137 There 
is no formal enforcement or guidance regarding what is sufficient for 
business necessity. As long as the state can make a convincing argument 
and with strategic emphasis on public safety, health, and welfare, it is 
likely that the burden will shift back to the claimant to demonstrate that 
there are alternatives.138 Additionally, licensing boards are frequently 
made up of licensed professionals in that occupation and they have the 
expertise to offer support for the business necessity of certain 
requirements to the occupation.  
Although Green set forth certain factors to use when assessing the 
relevance of criminal history, these factors are too general to be 
effective.139 Without an enforcement mechanism, licensing boards can still 
impose their own biases and experiences in the decision-making process. 
As a result, they effectively serve as the judge and the jury.  
 
134. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 92. 
135. Flake, supra note 96 at 84. 
136. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 92.  
137. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 92. 
138. See El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment for the 
defendant because the policy of disqualifying anyone with a criminal record is consistent with business 
necessity); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 570-71 (holding that the employer did not 
violate Title VII with its blanket ban policy of employees who use narcotic drugs because it was job 
related). 
139. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).   
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IV. PROPOSAL 
 
Reform of the statutory regime of occupational licensing is essential to 
integrate rehabilitation efforts during incarceration and those efforts made 
post-release. States should implement the following approach to correct 
for the exclusion of well-qualified applicants with a passion to succeed in 
the regulated trade: (1) licensing boards must consider rehabilitation 
factors in assessing an ex-offender’s application; (2) rejection must be 
predicated upon a direct relationship between the conviction and the 
licensed occupation; and (3) a presumption for licensure for ex-offenders 
who have completed correctional facilities' vocational training programs. 
 
A. Rehabilitation Factors 
 
Licensing boards often impose their discretion based on attitudes, 
experience, and prejudices. State legislatures have difficulty defining 
essential terms such as “moral character” and “moral turpitude”, yet they 
are content to allow an ex-offender’s criminal history bar the otherwise 
competent person from engaging in a trade. This tendency to disqualify 
ex-offenders is contrary to a multitude of research into human behavior 
and rehabilitation. State legislatures should replace or supplement “moral 
turpitude” or “moral character” requirements with more specific 
guidelines. This will help satisfy the state's policy to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of the public and to rehabilitate offenders without 
sacrificing the role of a licensing board’s purpose to maintain the quality 
of the trade.  
New York, for example, recommends that a licensing board consider 
the following factors: (1) the state’s public policy to encourage the 
licensure and employment of ex-offenders; (2) the specific duties and 
responsibilities of the license or employment; (3) how the individual’s 
criminal record would affect his or her ability to perform those specific 
duties and responsibilities; (4) the amount of time that has passed since the 
crime was committed; (5) how old the person was at the time of the crime; 
(6) the seriousness of the offense; (7) evidence of rehabilitation or good 
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conduct; (8) employers' legitimate interest in protecting both property and 
safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.140  
By providing guideposts that encourage a more individualized 
assessment of each ex-offender’s application for a particular occupation, 
this will help to deter the automatic association of criminal conviction with 
poor moral character.  
 
B. Direct Relationship of Conviction to the Occupation 
 
If there is a rejection based on a conviction, there should be a direct 
relationship between the applicant’s criminal conviction and the 
occupation. Occupational licensing laws should not impose additional 
punishment on ex-offenders. Rather, the purpose of these laws is to 
maintain the quality of the trade in an effort to protect the public safety, 
health, and welfare. Therefore, in order for an applicant to be rejected, the 
nature of the convicted crime should be a real threat to the public if the 
applicant was licensed.   
 
C. Presumption for Licensure 
 
Marc La Cloche’s five-year legal battle to work as a barber exemplifies 
the need for a presumption for licensure for ex-offenders who have 
completed vocational programs while incarcerated.141 This presumption 
would give offenders an incentive to pursue rehabilitation both pre- and 
post-release and provide a societal benefit. Without such a presumption, it 
is a waste of state resources to train inmates in a trade which they cannot 
pursue once released. To reiterate Judge York’s words, there cannot be “a 
situation in which the State successfully rehabilitated a citizen and then 
vigorously fought to deny him the right to live a rehabilitated life.”142 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
140. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753.1 (Consol. 2016). As Mr. La Cloche’s legal battle 
demonstrates, the recommendations that a licensing board consider a defined list of rehabilitation 
factors is insufficient. There must be a comprehensive approach, such as the one proposed here.  
141. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
142. Matter of La Cloche v. Daniels, No. 403466/2003, slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 
2006). 
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The impact of contemporary occupational licensing restrictions on ex-
offender employment opportunities is often in direct contradiction to 
criminal justice policies of deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation. 
Licensing restrictions that effectively ban ex-offender licensure have 
immense economic and criminal justice ramifications. Ex-offenders have 
had little or mixed success in legal challenges to the validity of 
occupational licensing laws. Therefore, state legislatures should amend the 
current statutory regime to more effectively and efficiently provide ex-
offenders with employment opportunities and simultaneously fulfill state 
goals of protecting of public health, safety, and welfare.  
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